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Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada
Poonam Purl*
I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning with their publication of Legal Determinants of
External Finance,' Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny ("LLSV") asked: "Why do some2
others?"
countries have so much bigger capital markets than
According to them, the answer lies in the legal environment of the
country-its legal origin.3 LLSV conclude that because common law
countries have better investor protection mechanisms and better
enforcement, bigger capital markets are more achievable. 4 They also
find that the concentration of ownership of shares in the largest
public companies is negatively related to investor protection. 5 Their
theories have led to a number of influential papers, either in
agreement, or as a critique to their work-collectively turning LLSV
"into the most cited economists in the world over the past decade." 6
While LLSV classified Canada as a common law jurisdiction in
their studies, Canada actually stands out as somewhat unique in the
world financial markets as one of the few countries with both
common and civil law traditions. While the federal government and
twelve of the thirteen provinces and territories operate under the
common law system, Quebec operates a civil law system in its

.

Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; CoDirector, Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University; Director of Research and
Policy, Capital Markets Institute, Rotman School of Business. (This paper is current as of
October 2009.) I would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Anne Ramsay,
Jody Wong, Nitika Puri, and Brandon Luft in the preparation of this Article. An earlier version
of this paper was presented at the "Evaluating Legal Origins Theory" Symposium at the
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University in 2009.
1. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131
(1997).
2. Id. at 1131.
3. Id. at 1149.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1132.
6. Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator,LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, available
at http://egalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/feature-thompson-janfebO5.msp.
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province within the larger Canadian common law framework. This
fact makes Canada an interesting jurisdiction for exploration of the
LLSV theories, conclusions, and critiques.
Canada's capital markets are also different than the United States
or the United Kingdom. Canada is a small player in the world's
capital markets, with Canadian issuers representing only 3% of the
world's capital. 7 Despite Canada being such a small player, the
number of Canadian public companies is relatively high compared to
other countries, with about 4000 issuers listed on the TSX and TSX
Venture Exchange.' Canada also has a small number of very large
issuers and a large number of very small issuers. For example, the
market capitalization of the 200 largest issuers listed on the TSX
accounts for more than 88% of the total market capitalization of all
TSX and TSX Venture Exchange listed companies.9 Over 190 of
Canada's largest issuers are also listed on major U.S. exchanges.'" In
addition, a significant number of the largest non-financial public
companies in Canada have controlling or major shareholders. 1'
Studies show that valuations of Canadian companies cross listed
in the United States are higher than those listed only in Canada. 2
Studies also show that the cost of capital in Canada is approximately
twenty-five basis points higher than in the United States. 13 These
differences in valuation and cost of capital could be the result of
differences in the quality of investor protection between Canada and
7. Id.
8. The June 2009 statistics show 1503 issuers listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange
("TSX"), while 2429 issuers are listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. See TMX GROUP INC.,
MARKET STATISTICS, http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/MarketStatisticsTMXGroup-Q22009.
pdf.
9. Christopher Nicholls, The Characteristics of Canada's Capital Markets and the
Illustrative Case of Canada'sLegislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley, June 15, 2006,
at 133, available at http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4283A29%2ONicholls.pdf.
10. New York Stock Exchange, Listing Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/
listed/lc.all-region_l.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2009); NASDAQ, Listed Companies,
http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp?page=C&previousCount=30&region=Nort
hamerica (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
11. NICHOLLS, supra note 9, at 134; see also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Pur, Dual
Class Shares in Canada:A HistoricalAnalysis, 29 DALHOUSIE L.J. 117, 126-32 (2006).

12. Michael R- King & Dan Segal, Market Segmentation and Equity Valuation:
Comparing Canada and the United States, 18 J. INT'L. FIN. MARKETS, INST. & MONEY 245,

246 (2008).
13. Paul Halpren & Poonam Pur, 'Canada Steps Up'--Task Force to Modernize
Securities Legislation in Canada:Recommendationsand Discussion, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 191,
191 (2007).
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the United States. It is reasonable to attribute these differences to
investor concerns about Canada's fragmented regulatory structure
for securities, concerns about ineffective enforcement vis-a-vis the
United States, and concerns about the significance of large numbers
of controlling or major shareholders in Canada. These factors
suggest that context is important in the relative strengths of the
capital market and investor protection and that there is much more
at play than can be found in examining the system of laws.
Canada (and Quebec within Canada) provides an excellent
context in which to explore the nuances of the LLSV theories,
conclusions, and critiques on investor protection, capital markets,
and legal families. Three issues are explored in this paper. The first
issue is how and why Canada fared relatively well (in contrast to the
United States in particular) in the recent financial crisis. The second
issue is why Canada still has not created a national regulator for
securities, despite more than forty years of attempts to do so. The
third issue explored in this paper is how Quebec, as a civil law
jurisdiction, operates within an overarching Canadian common law
framework and the cross-fertilization implications of a civil law
system within a common law jurisdiction.
I explore these three issues by examining the development of
various investor protection laws and structures over time in Canada
(as opposed to a point in time as the LLSV studies do), and also by
providing context which helps to explain why certain rules and
structures have been adapted and others, while economically
efficient, may have been rejected. This exploration of Canada
highlights that context matters when looking at the laws related to
investor protection within a country. Not all investor protection
mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes, as LLSV assumes.
LLSV did not explore securities law rules, securities law structures, or
banking laws. In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, securities
laws and securities structure have an impact on investor protection
and the debate on a common securities regulator has focused on
improving investor protection and improving enforcement.
Furthermore, banking laws and the banking framework play an
important role in investor protection, in the broader sense. In
Canada, investor protection is reflected in the conservative nature of
its banking system which allowed Canadian financial institutions to
escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial crisis. Finally,
the Canadian system is both structured in such a way and has
1673
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evolved in such a way that investor protections are fairly consistent
between the common law and civil law provinces, even when the civil
law statute does not necessarily mimic the common law statute. The
unifying role of the Supreme Court of Canada and the unifying
effect of various bodies such as the Canadian Securities
Administrators for provincial securities laws that work to ensure that
the laws and regulations are consistent across the country.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II explores the details of the
LLSV studies. Part III highlights critiques of the LLSV studies and
their conclusions. Part IV explores the case of Canada in relation to
investor protection and capital markets. It first explores how Canada
faired during the recent financial crisis. It then explores the debate
over a national securities commission. Finally, it considers the
position of Quebec, as the only civil law province, within Canada,
and how investor protections have remained relatively harmonized
between legal families. Part V concludes.
II. WHAT Do LLSV SAY?
This Part of the paper summarizes the findings and contentions
of LLSV noted at the beginning of this Article.14 In their well-known
1998 paper Law and Finance,5 LLSV looked at laws pertaining to
investor protection. Their goal was to "establish whether laws
pertaining to investor protection differ across countries and whether
these differences have consequences for corporate finance." 1 6 In
order to reach their goal, they distinguished between common
families of law within civil law (French, German, and Scandinavian),
and those within common law (British colonies, United States,
Canada, Australia, and India), using a sample of forty-nine
countries.
While they acknowledge that legal scholars often
disagree upon the definition of a "legal family," they based their
research on the approach used by scholars that enabled the
identification of civil law and common law traditions. 8 Furthermore,
to classify countries into legal families, LLSV relied on the works of

14. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
15. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998)
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Law &Finance].
16. Id. at 1121.
17. !d.at1115-16.
18. Id. at 1117-19.
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Reynolds and Flores.19
The measurement of investor protection was done by looking at
shareholder rights, anti-director rights, and creditor protection
20
rights. Some of the criteria they used for coding shareholder and
anti-director rights were: one share - one vote, proxy by mail
allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting,
oppressed minority, pre-emptive right to new issues, and percentage
of share capital to call extraordinary shareholder meeting. In terms
of creditor protection rights3 2 LLSV scored countries in both
reorganization and liquidation.
Based on a regression analysis, they concluded that common law
countries tend to afford more protection to their investors than do
civil law countries, while French civil law countries offer the weakest
protection. 2 ' They also noted that the ranking is roughly the same
for both shareholder protection and creditor protection, meaning
"[i]t is not the case that some legal families protect shareholders and
others protect creditors." 24
With these findings in mind, LLSV further posed the question of
whether countries with poor investor protection compensate in other
ways, such as having quality law enforcement. 25 To evaluate the
quality of law enforcement, LLSV used five criteria: efficiency of
judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and
likelihood of contract repudiation by the government.26 From their
data, LLSV answer their question in the negative. 27 They ultimately
conclude that law enforcement is stronger in common law countries,
and weakest in the French civil law countries. 28 But while quality of
law enforcement does not compensate for the quality of laws,
countries tend to develop substitute mechanisms, like ownership
concentration, for poor investment protection.2 9
19.

Id.

at 1119 (citing THOMAS REYNOLDS & ARTURO FLORES, FOREIGN LAW:

CURRENT SOURCES OF BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989)).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1127-28, 1134.
1122-25 (listing the variables used in the study).
1134.
1129.
1139.
1139-40.
1140.
1141.
1141, 1145.

1675

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

However, do countries with poor investor protection actually
suffer? While LLSV had no definitive answer to this question, they
do suggest a positive association between the legal system and
economic development. 3 In subsequent research, LLSV attempted
to expand on their findings. In 1999, they set out to study the effect
of protections on valuation and found that countries with better
shareholder protection are associated with a higher valuation of
corporate assets.3"
The Legal Origins Theory debate continues and has led to a
surge of publications on this subject matter. While LLSV have paved
the way with their arguments and findings, they have garnered a lot
of support and criticism at the same time. But ultimately, the
discussions and debates will further our understanding of the
differences in investor protection and market outcomes around the
world.
III. CRITIQUES OF LLSV

The LLSV legal origins theory has been critiqued in several ways
including: A. methodology, B. coding and variables, C. context, and
D. other explanations.
A. Methodology
The methodology that LLSV employ in their studies is one of
the more obvious criticisms. The problem with using regression
analysis as a main tool is simply the fact that correlation does not
equal causation, and that correlation can be misleading. For example,
while no law in the United States or United Kingdom requires
boards of directors to be independent of management, correlation
makes it seem like legal rules "caused" this independence because it
is the norm in both these countries.3 2 Law in general is hard to
quantify, and, thus, some speculate on the usefulness of such
quantitative studies.33 In his 2005 paper, Siems reviewed the use of
30. Id. at 1153.
31. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protectionand Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147,
1166-69 (2002).
32. John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-CountryExamination of the Private
Benefits of Control 6-7 (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 183, 2001), available at
http-//papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=257613.
33. Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need StatisticalEvidence in
Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. LAw 521 (2005).
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numerical comparisons of laws and found both arguments for and
against the use of numerical comparisons. The critiques include the
argument that numerical comparisons oversimplify the complex legal
systems that exist where historical context and institutional
dimensions play an important role,34 as discussed further below.
Furthermore, law is extraordinary by the dynamic nature of the lawand-society systems, including extra-jurisdictional complexities,
which need to be considered when studying the impact of laws."
Laws are prescriptive and reactive and are more about values then
they are quantifiable.36 Finally, the focus of legal rules, especially in
the context of comparative law, should be on the functionality of
laws rather than the legal similarities and differences.3 7 LLSV's focus
on whether a rule exists or does not exist in various countries ignores
the possibility of other legal solutions which achieve the same result,
but in a different manner.38 The legal context of laws within the
social fabric of a country is a critical element of comparative law that
cannot be established by applying simplifying numerical comparisons
it may apply to a comparison of
of law between countries, although
39
country.
same
the
within
laws
While there is criticism of the use of numerical comparisons in
legal research, the LLSV theories could be seen as a way to reduce
the complicated endeavour of comparative law into something that is
more understandable and therefore useable.4" There are also
arguments that law is no more extraordinary than any other social
science, such as economics or political science, and yet these sciences
are able to use statistics to analyze data to some degree of success.4
Finally, since the study of comparative law is relatively new, especially
in terms of methodology, there are no set rules on how to conduct
these types of studies.4 2
In addition, it is argued that the categorization of law seems
arbitrary and the distinction between common and civil law is not

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 531,533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 537.
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useful in terms of a law-and-finance analysis.43 As a result, some have
suggested a more precise criteria consisting of four identifiers:
European colonization (colonizing power), language, relative
importance of statutory law and courts, and formality/flexibility of a
legal system." Clear criteria are necessary in order to categorize law,
otherwise it may result in measurement errors and biased
coefficients. 4"
B. LLSV Coding and Variables
Besides concerns with methodological tools, the LLSV coding
may also be questionable. 6 One specific example is that it may be
misleading to code the components of investor protection in a binary
manner as being satisfactory or not satisfactory since it is often in the
middle.47 Spamann has argued that there is inconsistent treatment in
the coding, and when he corrected the values of the "Antidirector
Rights Index," he obtained data showing that the findings of LLSV
did not hold-there was no difference between common and civil
law jurisdictions.4"
Apart from this coding inconsistency, other variables are
inconsistently coded or used as well.49 For example, whereas a
"mandatory dividend" variable appears on the LLSV 1998 study, 0 it
is left out in the LLSV 2000 study.5 1 LLSV 1998 also did not
differentiate between default and mandatory legal rules.5 2
Furthermore, many of the shareholder protection variables have not
been theoretically or empirically determined, the number of variables
43. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Financeand Comparative
Law, 52 McGILL L.J. 55 (2007).
44. Id. at 70-73.
45. Id. at 70.
46. See Stefan Voigt, Are InternationalMerchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds
Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2008).
47. Caspar Rose, The Challenges of Quantifying Investor Protection in a Comparative
Context, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 369, 384-85 (2007).
48. Holger Spamann, 'Law and Finance' Revisited 16-17 (Harvard Law School John
M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfmabstract id=1095526.
49. Id. at 7.
50. La Porta et al., supra note 15, at 1123.
51. La Porta et al., supra note 31, at 1156-57.
52. Rose, supra note 47, at 391. To their credit, this aspect was later incorporated by
expanding the variable descriptions. Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of SelfDealing(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11883, 2005).
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used to measure the legal frameworks is insufficient, and there may
be bias in the variables chosen because they are derived from
common law. 3
In reconsidering LLSV's shareholder protection measures for
Austria and the United Kingdom, Schmidbauer compiled his own
shareholder protection score for the index, and concluded that law is
not the main link-it only plays an assisting role. 4 Perhaps one of the
more important limitations is that the indices that LLSV create only
provide us with a cross-sectional view of the law at a point in time."
When legal rules are coded as they have evolved over time, including
norms derived from takeover codes and corporate governance
codes, 6 the differences between civil and common law jurisdictions
converge over time. 57 Further, while using this new index, 8 there
was no link between shareholder protection and stock market
development. This suggests that perhaps strength of shareholder
protection may not matter for financial development.5 9
C. Context
The critiques related to methodology lead into a discussion of
context. LLSV have been criticized for focusing largely on legal
families and very little on the way by which the law has developed
within the specific country. 6 The context in which laws are
developed is important. The history of a country matters when
looking at how laws are developed, as it may help to explain why
there are similarities and differences between jurisdictions. In
addition, the political economy and the social and cultural
circumstances of a country are important to demonstrate that

53. Robert Schmidbauer, On the Fallacy of LLSV Revisited-Further Evidence About
Shareholder Protection in Austria and the United Kingdom 10 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=91 3968.
54. Id. at 44.
55. John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An
Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis 11 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 108, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094355.
56. Id. at 12.
57. See id. at 37-39.
58. Id. at 32-35.
59. Id.
60. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect 16 (William Davidson, Working Paper No.
410, 2001), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/39794.

1679

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

although the laws may be different, the effect may be similar in terms
of investor protection. This may be especially true when countries
are at different stages of development, as the law then must deal with
different social problems, not just investor protection.6"
In a similar manner, Pistor proposed that the process in which
62
legal change occurs is crucial for the development of effective law.
She argues that "for law to be effective, it must become part of the
institutional fabric of a society, contributing to the process of
institutional innovation and change." 6 3 Formalizing laws on the
books is not sufficient; rather, it is "[o]nly when the law is usedwhen it is modified in response to changing demands or
law truly
becomes
socioeconomic
conditions"-that
the
4
operationalized. In essence, the "success of a legal system is not
determined by having miraculously enacted good law at the outset
but by developing the capacity to continuously find solutions to new
problems." 65
There is also debate as to whether laws can be successfully
transplanted to other jurisdictions, given the specific context in
which the laws were first developed. Armour et al. suggested that
laws derived from corporate governance standards considered to be
international best practice do not work well when transplanted into
contexts removed from those of the systems in which they
originated.6 6 It was suggested that while investor protections relating
to independent board members and the mandatory bid rule, which
both originated in the common law, "may be well-fitted to a
dispersed ownership regime, they may work less well in systems with
concentrated ownership." 6 7 The view was that "[i]ndependent
directors do little to . . . [improve] majority-minority agency costs
where they are appointed by the majority shareholder; similarly, the
mandatory bid rule can, in this context, make it more difficult for
acquirers to purchase a company, by forcing the bidder to share the

61. Siems, supra note 33, at 532.
62. Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Evolution
of CorporateLaw and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries,WORLD BANK RES.
OBSERVER, Spring 2003, at 89-90.
63. Id. at 90.
64. Id.
65. Id,
66. Armour et al., supranote 55, at 40.
67. Id.

1680

1671

Legal Origins,Investor Protection,and Canada

control premium with minority shareholders.

68

D. Other Explanations
The last category of critiques in regards to LLSV's studies
concerns the view that legal origins cannot be the only explanation
for investor protection in capital market development. It is possible
that norms also play a factor in this equation.6 9 Legal rules are rooted
in an environment where norms and conventional practices play an
important role in the development, implementation, and
enforcement of laws. 7" The common law versus civil law argument
advanced by some commentators oversimplifies this complex
development. 7 ' Instead, perhaps non-legally enforceable social
norms, social cohesion, and signals72 can show that norms do matter.
In fact, they matter the most as a practical substitution for law when
law is the weakest.7" For example, signals about a corporation's
intentions become extremely important when the law and norms
about shareholder rights are weak.74
Another interesting perspective in the legal origins debate is
through the lens of international transactions. In such transactions,
businesspeople have a choice as to where they want to conduct the
transaction: under common law or civil law.7" Voigt's study revealed
that in structuring their transactions, businesspeople chose American
law less frequently than expected, while choosing French and Swiss
law more frequently than expected.7 6 This seems contrary to LLSV's
contentions because according to them, if common law more
effectively protected transactions, it should have been more
frequently chosen by businesspeople.7

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Coffee, supra note 32.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Voigt, supra note 46.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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IV. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE CANADIAN CAPITAL
MARKETS

A. Canada'sBanking System and the FinancialCrisis
Throughout the recent credit and financial crisis, the Canadian
banking system has managed to maintain a level of profitability,
liquidity, and financial stability not seen in other jurisdictions. The
Canadian banking system has recently been regarded by the IMF as a
paragon of international best practices.78 The World Economic
Forum also recently ranked it the soundest in the world.79 While
financial institutions around the world have collapsed or survived on
government bailouts, Canadian banks have had access to a more
modest mortgage purchase program. Moreover, as of early 2009, the
banks have no longer needed it.8" Canadian banks are well
capitalized and more conservative than banks in many other
jurisdictions of the world.8 '
How and why did Canada fare better than other jurisdictions?
This Article offers three related explanations. First, as discussed
below, Canada had developed more conservative banking laws than
other jurisdictions, which no doubt played a part in the relative
survival of its financial sector. This explanation is consistent with a
generalized version of LLSV's thesis that law matters (noting,
however, that LLSV do not explore legal rules in banking when
exploring investor protection, instead focusing only on corporate law
rules). However, legal rules offer only a partial explanation.
A second and contributing factor is legal structures. The
performance of Canadian banks during the economic crisis and
recession is due in part to the manner in which these banks are
regulated as well as the legal rules themselves. The design of the
regulatory bodies that oversee banking appears to play a part in
Canada's relative survival. This idea is evidenced by the fact that
countries such as the United States are attempting to transplant
Canadian structures such as the Financial Consumer Agency of

78. Pietro S. Nivola & John C. Courtney, Know Thy Neighbor: What Canada Can Tell
Us About FinancialRegulation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Apr. 23, 2009.
79. Michael E. Porter & Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009,
WORLD EcoN. FORUM, 2008, at 129.
80.

Id.

81.

Id.

1682

1671

Legal Origins, Investor Protection,and Canada

Canada into their own regulatory framework for banking.82 LLSV
did not consider the impact of regulatory design and structure on
investor protection, whereas I argue in this Article that it is an
important component.
A third factor at play is culture and norms. A more conservative
culture in the Canadian banking industry certainly had an impact on
the amount and type of risk taken on by banks, allowing them to
avoid the extent of losses of their competitors in other jurisdictions.
1. Historicaldevelopment of conservatism in the Canadianbanking
system
The historical context of Canada's banking system has played an
important role in the development of the current regulatory system,
the particular legal rules, and the relatively conservative culture of
Canadian bank management. A historical analysis of Canada's
banking system reveals a trend of major banking failures that pushed
Canada into a conservative approach towards banking, including
heavy regulation and strict government oversight. Banking in
Canada is centralized at the federal level, and there is no provincial
equivalent in Canada to the U.S. state chartered banks.8 3
Banking in Canada formally started when the British government
granted a charter that created the Bank of Montreal in 1817,
subsequently granting additional charters to other banks. The
Constitution Act of 1867 subsequently gave the federal government
legislative authority to deal with all issues related to "Banking,
Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money., 8 4 However,
Canada continued to have a decentralized banking system until the
early 1900s with the provinces being able to issue paper money. It
was in these years that Canadians learned the vulnerabilities and
dangers of independent, autonomous banks and the need to develop
a system of sufficient government oversight and regulation to govern
Canada's banking system.
Several large bank failures in the 1920s, including the Merchants
Bank of Canada and the Home Bank of Canada, highlighted to the

82. House Panel Set to Start Work on Consumer-FinanceAgency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 125432239442852629.html.
83. Id.
84. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R-S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985).
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government that some sort of regulatory oversight was required to
protect the banks' stakeholders. In both the cases above, practically
no warning was provided to stakeholders, depositors and investors
that a failure was imminent.85 Not only did the collapse of major
banks create a discussion of the government's role in the operations
of chartered banks, but specific provisions were being established in
order to prevent further stakeholder destruction and ensure stability
of Canadian banks.86 In 1933, a Royal Commission8 7 was established
to study the Canadian banking system and determine whether a
central banking institution was needed. 88 The Commission
recommended in favor of a central bank and offered specific
suggestions that were incorporated into the Bank of Canada Act
("BOC Act"), 89 and the Bank of Canada was created in 1935 as a
private bank.9 ° In 1938 the BOC Act was amended and the Bank of
Canada became nationalized.9"
One important aspect of the BOC Act is the deferral of standard
setting of key bank requirements to the "Office of the
Superintendent" ("OSFI"). OSFI currently plays a role as one of six
regulatory oversight bodies92 that regulate aspects of the banking
system and acts as the main banking regulator. OSFI's mandate
partially explains the reasons for Canada's sound banking system. It
states that OSFI was created to contribute to public confidence in
the Canadian financial system by "supervising institutions and
pension plans to determine whether they are in sound financial
85.

History, BANK

OF

CANADA,

2009,

http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/about/

history.html.
86.

Id.

87. Proceedings of the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency, Canada, Ottawa,
ROYAL
COMMISSION
ON
BANKING
AND
CURRENCY
(1933),
available at

http://www.scribd.com/doc/9626270/Royal- Commission-on- Banking-and-Currency- 1933CANADA-Proceedings-Vol-i -to-6-Highlights.
88.

History, BANK OF CANADA, supra note 85. See generally M.H. OGILVIE, BANK AND

CUSTOMER LAW IN CANADA (2007); James L. Darroch & Charles J. McMillan, Entry Barriers
and Evolutions of Banking Systems: Lessons from the 1980s Canadian Western Bank Failures,50
CANADIAN PUB. ADMIN. 141, 141-66 (2007).

89. Bank of Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. B 2 (1985).
90. History, BANK OF CANADA, supra note 85.
91. Id.
92. The Department of Finance, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Bank
of Canada, the Financial Consumer Agency, and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institution set standards, coordinate the overall regulatory structure, and enforce it with
sanctions. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) plays a dominant role in
shaping mortgage default-insurance policy.
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condition . . . and are complying with their governing law and
supervisory requirements." 93 OSFI has traditionally and consistently
set Canadian bank requirements higher than those set out or
recommended by other major economic powers, including Basel II;
the most relevant example of this is the capital adequacy guidelines
required for Canadian banks.94
2. Legal rules and implementationgoverning the Canadianbanking
system
An important aspect of banking stability is the ability of banks to
manage their capital during economic downturns. One area that
OSFI regulations have protected the stability of banks in the face of
economic downturn is the Tier 1 capital requirement 9" placed on
Canadian banking institutions. OSFI has set out a minimum
requirement on Canadian financial institutions to carry a Tier 1
capital ratio of 7% and an overall capital ratio of 10%.96 As a
comparison, the 2004 Basel II Accord, which sets out international
regulations, set minimum
for banking
recommendations
requirements of 4% Tier 1 capital ratio and 8% total capital ratio. 97
The United States has a Tier 1 capital requirement of 6% and a total
capital requirement of 10% while the United Kingdom followed the
Basel II requirements of 4% and 8% respectively.9" After reflecting on
the toxic assets that doomed many of the major institutions in the
United States during the crisis and recession, it becomes even clearer

93. Our Mandate, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
CANADA, Mar. 3, 2007, http://wwsv.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index-.aspx?DetaillD=2.
94. Bank Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 46 (Can.).
95. Tier 1 capital is a measure of an institution's ability to deal with unexpected losses.
96. ConsultativePaper on the New Basel HIFramework, OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT
OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS 40 (2004).

97. Guideline-CapitalAdequacy Requirements, OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
(2007),
http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/
INSTITUTIONS
guidelines/capital/ guidelines/CARAl-e.pdf. Capital requirements are crucial in OSFI's
"Assets to Capital Multiple" test, which is placed on all financial institutions. OSFI requires
that this ratio does not exceed twenty, meaning that an institution's total assets can be more
than twenty times greater than the sum of its tier 1 and tier 2 capital. Since this type of capital
is strictly calculated, it ensures that an institution will always have an adequate degree of
permanent capital in relation to its total assets. Therefore, even if a number of assets are written
down or written off, the institution wil still have an adequate level of "permanent capital" to
ensure that it remains financially stable.
FIN.

98. Canada:2009 Article IV Consultation-StaffReport; Staff Statement; and Public
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion, INT'L MONETARY FUND (2009).
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why strict and effective capital requirements are so important for
financial institutions.
Stricter legal rules in Canada for mortgage loans may have also
had an impact. In Canada, both OSFI and the CMHC exercise
prudential oversight and influence over mortgage underwriting.
Mortgage lending in Canada tends to happen in the banking system
and relies less on the securitization of loans, as is more typical in the
United States. 99 Moreover, the United States has a substantially
larger sub-prime market at 13% of current outstanding mortgage
credit, while Canada has less than 3%.1"'
This is not to overemphasize the role of legal rules. Historically,
in both Canada and the United States, the four separate pillars of the
financial system-banking, trust companies, insurers, and securities
dealers-have not been allowed to operate within one
organization.' Both Canada and the United States changed their
rules in the 1980s and 1990s allowing banks to acquire investment
dealers but with different results.' °2 In the 1980s, Canada allowed
commercial banks to acquire and own investment dealers.
Accordingly, each of the five Canadian banks acquired a major dealer
as a subsidiary that then became subject to the regulatory framework
governing commercial banks in Canada. Independent dealers still
remain in Canada, but the major players have been absorbed by the
commercial banks. By contrast, when the four pillars were
dismantled in the United States, some of the largest investment
dealers stayed independent-Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns to
name two-and continued to be subject only to oversight by the
SEC, not by the U.S. Federal Reserve as a commercial bank. As a
result of the bailouts, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs agreed to
become chartered as bank holding companies and are therefore
under tighter supervision by the U.S. Federal Reserve. 0 3 Thus,
despite the same legal rules permitting similar industry structures, the
99. Nivola & Courtney, supra note 78.
100. Impacts of the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, DESJARDINS ECON. STUD. (2007),
http://www.desjardins.com/en/a-propos/etudes-economiques/actualites/point vueecono
mique/pve70814.pdf.
101. The Canadian Financial Services Sector, DEP'T OF FIN. CANADA (2005),
http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/fact-cfss-eng.asp.
102. Id.
103. Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall
Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj .com/article/SB 122202739111460721 .html.
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nature of the Canadian commercial and investment banking industry
had a different risk profile than that in the United States.
3. Culture of operationalcaution in the Canadianbanking system
A more conservative culture is also a contributing factor. While
Canadian laws are more conservative than international standards,
Canadian banks tend to be even more conservative than the OSFI
regulations. While OSFI set out a minimum Tier 1 capital
requirement of 7%, Canadian banks have been at 9.8%, several
percentage points above the regulatory requirement. 10 4 This is in
contrast to the average capital ratio for United States investment
banks, which was at 4%, and for European commercial banks, which
was at 3.3%.05
On the one hand, the analysis of Canadian banks and the
financial crisis appears to support LLSV. Canada's more conservative
Tier 1 capital requirements and asset to capital multiple, in
comparison to international standards (and its U.S. neighbor), has
played an important part in Canada's banks avoiding the extent of
the financial crisis in the United States.
On the other hand, this brief discussion also highlights that
context, norms, and culture also play a critical role. Even though the
laws set certain caps or ratios on the banks' capital, most Canadian
banks maintained a less risky capital ratio than required by the law,
reasonably reflecting a more conservative nature as a product of the
development of its banking system. This is not to say that all
Canadian banks were or are equally conservative or that they will
necessarily remain so. As some of Canada's larger banks have
expanded internationally, some have been more exposed to the
United States credit crisis, resulting in large write-offs of bad
mortgages or lending to high risk entities that have failed. 10 6 In
gaining exposure to foreign markets where the culture is not so
conservative, one can only question to what degree their conservative
nature will transplant to these new environments and vice versa.

104. Erik Heinrich, Why Canada's Banks Don't Need Help, TIME, Nov. 10, 2008,
availableat http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1855317,00.html.
105. Id.
106. Duncan Mavin, CIBC's Writedown Woes Not Over, Say Analysts, FIN. POST,
June 23, 2008, available at http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=608460.
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B. Why Does Canadanot yet have a NationalSecurities Regulator?
While the rest of the world is discussing the merits of a common
or integrated financial regulator in the wake of the financial crisis,1" 7
Canada continues with its long standing debate over a single
Canadian securities regulator. Canada has thirteen provincial and
territorial securities regulators, each with its own securities act, fees,
and processes. Historically, public companies that wished to raise
money across Canada had to file with each securities regulator and
pay the associated fees; similarly, intermediaries carrying on business
across Canada had to register with multiple commissions across the
08
country. 1
The debate over a common securities regulator has persisted over
forty years with little success in achieving agreement on its
creation. 9 A common sentiment throughout all attempts at
reforming Canada's securities regulatory system has been that the
current system, as presently operated, is inadequate to meet the
challenges of today and tomorrow. While the system is not broken in
the sense of regulatory oversight, it must be improved significantly in

107. See generally John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009).
108. There have been significant strides made to harmonize securities regulation across
Canada. Since the 1990s, there has been harmonization of rules through the Canadian
Securities Administrators and the creation of National Instruments, which sets out common
regulations. In addition, there is now a passport system to streamline administrative processing
of prospectuses and applications, and in 2009 a national registration system was created.
109. The calls for a national securities regulator began in earnest in 1964 when the Royal
Commission on Banking and Finance recommended that the federal government establish a
single federal agency that would take over the major responsibility for securities regulation
from the provinces. Although this initiative failed, it did result in more interprovincial
cooperation. In 1979, the federal government published Proposalsfor a Securities Market Law
for Canada, which also proposed a single securities commission for Canada to regulate
international and interprovincial issues of and trading in securities. Between 1994 and 1996,
the federal government made several attempts to get provincial agreement on a proposal to
create a Canadian Securities Commission. while there were periodic negotiations and an
agreement was drafted, the federal government dropped the initiative due to opposition in
Quebec and the western provinces. In December 2003, the federally commissioned Wise
Persons' Committee once again proposed a single national regulator and attempted to address
local interests, but nothing came of it. In June 2006, the Ontario-appointed Crawford Panel
released a Blueprintfor a CanadianSecurities Commission where the call was once again for a
model for a "common securities regulator" for Canada, operating under common legislation.
The most recent attempt at building support for a national securities regulator was the January
2009 report by the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation. The Expert Panel again
recommended a Canadian Securities Commission and even presented a draft securities act.
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order for Canada to remain competitive in attracting capital.1"' The
international community has also waded into the debate. The IMF
has repeatedly indicated that Canada needs a single securities
regulator."' A Canadian securities regulator is currently one of the
issues on the table for the proposed Canada-EU trade deal. 2
In this part of the paper, I argue that securities regulatory
structure matters for investor protection. LLSV, however, do not
take into account regulatory structure (or securities law rules for that
matter). Rather, they focus on legal rules and, specifically, only
corporate law rules. While corporate law is not unimportant, it is
based on a system of self-regulation where market actors must pursue
litigation in the courts themselves. While corporate law remains an
important framework of protection of investors in private companies,
securities laws are a primary source of investor protections for public
companies in Canada and in many other jurisdictions. 3 Similarly,
while courts are important (a factor that LLSV take into account),
securities regulators' actions are arguably even more important in
certain instances in ensuring investor protection. 4
I also argue in this part of the paper that context is critical in the
debate on a national securities regulator and that political, economic,
and historic circumstances constrain the choices and decisions that
are possible. Most reasonable people would agree that if Canada
were starting from scratch in designing a regulator for securities
matters it would create a single regulator for the entire country;
however, the provinces having occupied this space for so long and
Quebec having a special place in Canada result in a tremendous
obstacle to the possibility of a federal or single structure. A related
110. Five Year Review Committee, Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing
the Securities Act (Ontario), at 7 (2003), available at http://wwv.fin.gov.on.ca/
en/publications/2003/yrsecuritiesreview.pdf (recommending that "the provinces, territories
and federal government work towards the creation of a single securities regulator with
responsibility for the capital markets across Canada").
111. Canada Needs National Securities Regulator: IMF, CBC NEWS, June 19, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2007/06/19/imf.html.
112. Lee Berthiaume, Canada-EU Trade Deal Could Require National Securities
Regulator, EMBASSY MAG., Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.embassymag.ca/page/
view/eu- 1-21-2009.
113. See JEFFERY MACINTOSH & CHRISTOPHER NICHOLLS, ESSENTIALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (2002); Anita Anand, Securities Regulation at an Impasse: Developing Effective
Regulation in an Ineffective Regulatory Regime, 20 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 191, 216 (2005).
114. POONAM PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN THE CANADIAN CAPITAL
MARKETS (Dec. 2005) (commissioned by the Capital Markets Institute).
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point is that, in the absence of a change in formal legal structures in
Canada, there have been reasonable attempts at functional changes,
by way of harmonizing laws and streamlining processes to create, for
example, the Passport system."' 5
One of the principle debates over a common securities regulator
relates to the question of whose jurisdiction does securities
regulation fall within: the federal government or the provinces? In
Canada, the supervision of the securities industry was not explicitly
given to either the provincial or federal levels of government within
the Constitution Act, 1867. Over the years, as the capital markets
have grown, the provinces and territories have begun to regulate
securities under the "property and civil rights" clause of the
Constitution Act, 1867,116 which has resulted in each province and
territory having its own securities regulator.' 7 While there have been
expert opinions indicating that the federal government could assert
jurisdiction over capital markets," 8 possibly pursuant to its power to
legislate in respect of the "regulation of trade,"".9 the federal
government has always been reluctant to use this jurisdiction. To
date, the jurisdiction of the federal government to override
provincial securities law has never been tested in a court. °
While the current system of multiple regulators has strengthsincluding a local presence, development of industry expertise,
responsiveness to distinct local and regional issues, and innovationthere are a number of weaknesses. 2 ' The weaknesses include
115. The Passport System was designed to simplify the regulatory approval process by
allowing market participants to deal with a regulator in a centralized way and have the
regulator's decisions recognized across all Canadian jurisdictions. The Passport System replaces
the principal regulator and mutual reliance review system for prospectuses and for certain
exemptive relief applications. See Ward Sellers & Daniel Yelin, Canadian Securities Regulators
Implement Next Phase of Passport System, http://www.osler.com/expertise-mergers.aspx?
id=14604. The national registration system, which creates a new Canada-wide registration
regime, came into effect on September 28, 2009.
116. Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(13) (Can.).
117. Andrew Kitching, Securities Regulation: Callsfor a Single Regulator, at 2 (Feb. 16,
2009) (on file with the Library of Parliament), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
information/library/PRBpubs/prb0838-c.htm#jurisdiction.
118. The Wise Persons' Committee commissioned three opinions as to the constitutional
issues related to a national securities regulator, available at http://www.wiseaverties.ca/report en.html.
119. Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(2) (Can).
120. Kitching, supra note 117, at 2 n.4.
121. Wise Persons Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in
Canada, It's Time, at 25 (2003), available at http://www.wise-avcrties.ca/mainen.html.
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enforcement, or lack thereof, inefficient allocation of resources,
coordination difficulties, inconsistent priorities within investor
protection, and policy development. There are also costs associated
with thirteen securities regulators, including duplication of costs,
cost of compliance,

perception

time delays,

in the international

opportunity

community

costs,

and

the

of a fragmented

regulatory system. 122

Enforcement of securities law is considered weak as compared to
other jurisdictions, somewhat as a result of the fragmented system of
securities regulation. 2 3 In the Task Force to Modernize Securities
Regulation, Bhattacharya found that the enforcement of securities
laws reduces the cost of capital, which in turn increases liquidity in
the capital markets, and, as measured against the United States,
enforcement of securities laws is weak in Canada.'2 4
The inefficient allocation or lack of resources is another criticism
of the current structure, as each province and territory has a
securities commission with similar mandates. 2 However, with the
exception of Ontario, jurisdictions do not typically have sufficient
resources to perform all the tasks of oversight, policy development,
and enforcement.' 2 6 This leads to coordination difficulties between
provinces and territories in terms of timing and priorities. Priorities
among provincial or territorial securities commissions may differ,
often on political grounds, in terms of investor protections and
policy development.
Issuers and intermediaries also criticize the costs associated with
complying with the requirements of thirteen securities regulators.
While public companies pay fees to each jurisdiction, fees are in some
cases paid to the provincial government, not directly to the securities
commission for their use. The costs of complying with thirteen
122. Id.
123. Poonarn Puri, Will Canada Step Up? Improving Enforcement in the Canadian
CapitalMarkets, CAN. INVESTMENT REV., Spring 2007, at 53; see also John C. Coffee, Law
and
the
Market:
The
Impact
of
Enforcement,
(2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cfdev/AbsByAuth.cfm? per-id=80028#show 967482; Mary
Condon, Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in Ontario Securities Regulation, 32 QUEENS
L.J. 1 (2006); Halpren & Puri, supra note 13.
124. Utpal Bhattacharya, Enforcement and Its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of
the Market, 4 Canada Steps Up (Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada,
May 24, 2006).
125. See generally The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada,
available at http://www.tfmsl.ca.
126. See PURI, supra note 114.
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different securities acts or legislation, while significantly harmonized,
are nonetheless imposed on public companies.
On the international front, Canada is not represented at the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, but, rather,
two of Canada's largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, sit as
members. 1 27 The inability for Canada to have a single, consistent
voice on the international stage has the potential to create problems
in terms of implementing effective change to Canada's capital
markets.
Despite the numerous studies, commissions, and panels that have
been organized, the lack of political will of the federal government to
move to a national regulator exists for several reasons. First, while
not necessarily efficient or cost effective, the thirteen provincial and
territorial securities commissions have taken a number of steps to
harmonize their regulations and streamline their processes, which
some will argue gets Canada functionally to the same point without a
constitutional challenge. 128 Secondly, similar to other issues that have
a constitutional jurisdictional element to them, the proposals for a
national securities regulator have not historically garnered much
support from the provinces, with the exception of Ontario.'2 9
Quebec and Alberta have constantly expressed their disagreement
with this strategy and have recently indicated that they will bring a
court challenge to prevent national securities regulation. 3 ° British
Columbia has previously been opposed to a national regulator, its
position has recently shifted. 13 Third, the political will to create a
national securities regulator has historically not been strong. The
recent financial crisis and a number of high profile fraud cases are
127. International
Organization
of
Securities
Commissions,
available at
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display-members.cfm.
128. Council of Ministers Communiqu6, Council of Ministers Continues to Implement
Passport System (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.securitiescanada.org/20081022_communique-english.pdf.
129.

Canada Doesn't Need NationalSecurities Regulator:Stelmach, CBC NEWS, Jan. 14,

2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/edmonton/story/2009/01/14/edm-stelmach-regulator.
html.
130. Chantal H~bert, Tories See Opportunity in Regulator Feud, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 14,
2009, available at http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/570624; see also Francois
Shalom, Quebec to Contest Single Regulator Plan, MONTREAL GAZETTE, July 9, 2009, at B1.
131. At the time of writing (November 2009), the Government of Canada announced
that it intends to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of
proposed Canadian securities legislation. Press release available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/news-nouv/nr- cp/2009/doc_32437.html.
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some of the major events that have spurred the federal government
to move forward with a solid proposal for a national securities
regulator.
The federal government recently announced a Transition Team
and gave it a budget of $150 million to negotiate with the provinces
to establish a common securities regulator, based on the report and
1 32
recommendations of the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation.
Needless to say, political, economic and cultural influences have
played a role in the development of securities structure, and
functional forms will have an impact on the negotiations and the
model that is ultimately adopted. The Transition Team is currently
working on draft legislation and expects that a national securities
regulator will be running by 2012. s3
The case of Canada highlights why regulatory structure matters
when it comes to investor protection-corporate law cannot be
considered in isolation without considering securities law. In
addition, context plays an important role when considering the
impact of the regulatory structure on investor protection as the
historical, political, and economic circumstances all play a part in
whether an effective investor protection regime has been created.
C. Quebec - A Civil Law Province within a Common Law Country
Canada is somewhat unique in that both common law and civil
law operate within the same country. The federal government and
the provinces, other than Quebec, follow the common law. Mixed
legal systems are also found in Louisiana, Scotland, St. Lucia, Puerto
Rico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,
Namibia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. 13 4 Civil law, which is based
on a written "civil code," covers only matters of private law
including the legal attributes of a person; the relationship between
individuals and property; and the legal institutions governing or

132. The Canadian Securities Transition Office was established in July 2009 to assist in
establishing a Canadian securities regulator. See generally, available at http://www.csto.ca.
133. Canada Aims for National Securities Regulator by 2012, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept.
25, 2009, available at http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/business/story.html?
id=c2314556-2883-4d98-b4bf-2af8032273d0&k=81939.
134. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and
Uncodified) (Part 1), 4 UNIF. L. REv. 591, 592-93 (1999); William Tedey, Mixed
Jurisdictions:Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified) (PartII), 4 UNIF. L. REV.
877 (1999).
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administering these relationships. Civil codes are intended to be easy
to understand and apply to facts through the specific nature of each
regulation. It does not rely on precedent (or principles) to the same
5
extent as common law.13
LLSV suggest that civil law jurisdictions provide investors weaker
legal protection than common law jurisdictions.1 36 LLSV also suggest
that common law countries give shareholders and creditors the
strongest protection while French civil law countries provide the
weakest protection.' 3 7 But they did not address the situation where a
country has both common law and civil law systems. The LLSV
1998 study categorized Canada as a common law country, with the
result that Canada was considered average for shareholder
protection"' among common law countries, low for creditor
protection, 139 and high for enforcement of the laws. 4 ° This part of
the paper compares shareholder remedies and rights in the Quebec
provincial corporate law statute with the Federal Business
Corporations Act and finds that several important statutory remedies
that are found in the federal corporate law statute are absent-by
historical choice-from the Quebec statute. Nonetheless, Quebec
courts have developed judicial versions of the derivative action and
oppression action.
In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal and
provincial governments similar legislative authority over business
incorporation. Each government, federal and provincial/territorial,
has its own incorporation statutes. During the 1970s, the corporate
legislative framework in Canada underwent significant reform
inspired by the recommendations published in the Dickerson
Report."4 ' The purposes of this reform were threefold.

135. See JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY & RODERICK A. MACDONALD, QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW (1993); Canadian Bar Association-Ontario et al.,
The New Civil Code: A PracticalGuide to What Every Ontario Lawyer Needs to Know About
Quibec Law (1994); Pearl Eliadis, The Legal System in Quebec, in GERALD GALL, THE
CANADIAN LEGA SYSTEM 263-84 (5th ed. 2004).

136. Rafael La Porta et al., Law &Finance, supranote 15, at 1116.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 1130.
139. Id. at 1136.
140. Id. at 1142.
141. Margaret Smith, Canada Business Corporations Act: Directors' Residency
Requirements and Other Residency Issues, at 2, available at http://vww.parl.gc.ca/

information/library/PRBpubs/prb9931 -e.pdf.
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First, it attempted to offer a more pragmatic approach in regard to
the mechanics, operations, and incorporation of companies. Second,
it introduced a contractual approach with respect to how relations
between internal actors of the corporation were to be governed.
Finally, it offered a protective dimension to the interests and rights
of shareholders.
These aspects of the reform initiative were adopted in the
Canada Business CorporationsAct'4 2 ("CBCA") that was enacted in
1975. Following the federal initiative, provinces responded by either
enacting amendments to their respective corporate legislation or by
opting to proceed with a reform inspired by the federal model.
Quebec opted for the former by integrating Part IA to the Quebec
Companies Act ("QCA").'4 3 However, the Quebec legislature did
not strictly follow the Dickerson recommendations but rather chose
to refrain from adopting a shareholder protection regime similar to
the one found under the federal regulation. As a result, the QCA
contains certain provisions designed to protect shareholders but falls
short of offering similar remedies found in its federal counterpart,
the CBCA. Consequently, litigants in Quebec have to refer to
judicially created recourses found under the Civil Code of Quebec'44
("CCQ") and the Code of Civil Procedure'4 ' ("CCPC") in order to
fill the gap. However, the judicially created recourses lack the
flexibility and clarity usually associated with those found under the
CBCA.
In considering investor protection within Canada, it is necessary
to consider the distinctions between the CBCA and the QCA
statutes. Specific areas of corporate law that are of interest when
comparing the QCA and the CBCA are shareholder protection and
remedies.
While the QCA has specific preventive measures relating to
shareholder protection, it contains no explicit provision giving rise to
a derivative action, an oppression remedy, or a recourse seeking a
restraining and compliance order. In addition, the QCA does not
offer the possibility for shareholders to exercise their right to dissent
in the event a significant change similar to the ones listed in section
190(1) CBCA occurs. Nonetheless, the Quebec law still provides
142.

See generally CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, R.S.C., ch. C 44 (1985).

143.

CompaniesAct, R.S.Q., ch. C 38.

144.

Civil Code of Quebec, 1991 S.Q., ch. 64 (Can.).

145.

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. C 25.
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certain powers of control and supervision to the courts in order to
attempt to remedy this gap.
Unlike the specific statutory provisions of the CBCA, the
Quebec Superior Court has established the conditions under which a
shareholder may bring an action in the name of the corporation.14 6
In doing so, the Quebec court has stressed the importance of
limiting its superintending role to situations where there is manifest
fraudulent conduct committed by the individual(s) concerned. In
other words, it may be more difficult to proceed with such a claim
under the civil law regime since the standing to begin a derivative
action is limited to shareholders and there must be a fraudulent
element for it to proceed. Under the CBCA, a derivative action does
not require the presence of a fraudulent element. Rather, the action
must be taken in the best interests of the corporation. Further,
standing is not limited to shareholders under the CBCA.
Under federal legislation, the oppression remedy is regarded as
being a very powerful tool in providing shareholder protection. To
this day, the Quebec legislature has not followed suit with its federal
counterpart and as a result, litigants are left with section 33 CCPC as
a means of trying to bring such an action in Quebec courts. Over the
last couple of years, the Quebec Superior Court has been more
receptive to the idea of extending its superintending and governing
power to offer an action similar to the oppression remedy used in
common law provinces. Even though the court's power has only
been used in relation to cases dealing with fraud, some judges have
been openly considering the idea of broadening the scope of its
superintending and governing power to cases involving abuses of
rights or violation of the legitimate expectations of shareholders, in a
manner similar to the federal oppression remedy) 4 7
146. Lagaci v. Lagaci, [1966] C.S. 489. The four conditions are: (1) the one bringing
the action in the name of the corporation must be a shareholder; (2) the individual(s) at the
source of the problem must have an absolute control of the corporation, in the sense they must
control the board of directors as well as shareholder votes (holding a majority of votes); (3) the
shareholder bringing the claim must have requested an explanation and rectification of the
situation without receiving any positive response prior to engaging and proceeding with the
claim; and (4) the reproachable act committed by the individual(s) at the source of the
problem must be of a fraudulent nature towards the corporation or towards the shareholders.
The fourth criterion is very important and illustrates that simple negligence by directors would
not trigger the application of a derivative action.
147. Desautels v. Desautels, ([2005] C.S. Montreal 500-11-026015-053) (noting the
possibility of the court appropriating powers similar to those found in the case of an
"oppression remedy," should the case be deserving).
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In Canada, there are multiple corporate law statutes, with each
province and the federal government having their own statutes.
However, all statutes are subject to interpretation by the courts,
ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court is a
general court of appeal and the final authority on the interpretation
of the entire body of law in Canada. 4 The Supreme Court's
decisions help to unify the laws within Canada for two reasons. First,
they have the power to interpret both common law and civil law
legislation, and second, lower courts in all provinces must follow the
Supreme Court's decisions, to the extent the facts apply.
This discussion reveals that while Quebec operates a corporate
law framework within its civil law system that on the surface provides
legal rules that do not offer as much protection as the federal
corporate law statute (or other provincial law statues). The Quebec
courts have stepped in to judicially craft remedies for shareholders.
That being said, these QCA remedies are currently more difficult to
access or achieve recourse under than those in the federal statutory
regime. However, Quebec has recently proposed changes' 49 to the
Quebec Companies Act to incorporate many of the practices that
exist elsewhere in Canada, including better protection for
shareholders, and new governance rules. 5 ' Some of the proposed
changes relate to protections of minority shareholders including new
remedies in the event of abuse or inequity. Shareholders will have the
possibility of tabling a shareholder proposal at company meetings
and a minority shareholder who disagrees with a major change made
to the structure or the activities of the corporation may be able to
demand that his shares be repurchased.1 5 1 In addition, shareholders
will have the right to ask the Court for the authorization to act in
the name of the corporation, or derivative actions."12 Nonetheless,
this does indicate the reflexive relationship between a civil law
148. PETERW. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 246-49 (5th ed. 2007).
149. At the time of writing the Quebec legislature proposed amendments to the Quebec
Companies Act to align the legislation with other provinces and to improve certain aspects as
compared to other jurisdictions. See Reform of the Quebec Companies Act: Bill 63, Oct. 9,
2009, http://www.dwpv.com/en/17620-24316.aspx.
150. Press Release, Minist~re des Finances Quebec, Major Reform of the Companies Act (Oct.
7, 2009) http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/documents/commuiiques/en/COMEN_2009
1007.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Reform of the Quebec Companies Act: Bill 63, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.dwpv.
com/en/1 7620_24316.aspx.
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province and the common law operating on a national level.
V. CONCLUSION

Perhaps one of the most important results of the LLSV study was
to facilitate discussion of how law impacts the growth of capital
markets. As the three case studies in Canada illustrate, the context of
how laws develop is a strong indicator of how and why laws within
the capital markets have developed the way they have. It is not as
simple as delineating between common law and civil law
jurisdictions. Rather the political, economic, and historical
backgrounds are some of the important contributors to the
development of laws and legal structures.
In this paper I explored the situation of Canada during the
recent financial crisis, the efforts to create a national securities
regulator, and the role of Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction, within the
federation of common law jurisdictions. In exploring these issues it
was clear that the development of various investor protection laws and
structures over time in Canada (as opposed to a point in time as in
the LLSV studies), and also by providing context which helps to
explain why certain rules and structures have been adapted while
others, although economically efficient, may have been rejected. This
exploration of Canada highlights that context matters when looking
at the laws related to investor protection within a country. Not all
investor protection mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes,
as LLSV assume. LLSV do not explore securities law rules, securities
law structures, or banking laws. In Canada, as in many other
jurisdictions, securities laws and securities structure have an impact
on investor protection, and the debate on a common securities
regulator has focused on improving investor protection and
improving enforcement. Furthermore, banking laws and the banking
framework play an important role in investor protection. In Canada,
investor protection is reflected in the conservative nature of the
banking system which allowed Canadian financial institutions to
escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial crisis. Finally,
the Canadian system is both structured and has evolved in such a
way that investor protections are fairly consistent between the
common law and civil law provinces, even when the civil law statute
does not necessarily mimic the common law statute. This is the result
of various unifying bodies such as the Canadian Securities
Administrators, for provincial securities laws, and the unifying role of
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the Supreme Court of Canada, for corporate law principles across the
country.
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